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Genetic Information

and Health Insurance:
State Legislative Approaches
Karen H. Rothenberg

We may create a catch-22 so that only people who
are unlikely to need health insurance can afford
it. ... Genetic risk testing is important because it exposes the logic of a system that provides access to
health insurance to those least likely to need it. 1

T

he fear of generic discriminarion 2 in the health in- ·
surance contexrl cannot be underestimated. Some
have argued that individuals who might otherwise
choose genetic testing will decline it based on their fear
that they or their family members will not be able to obtain or maintain health insurance coverage.~ As a result,
the future of research on the benefits and risks of testing
for genetic conditions, including susceptibility to such common diseases as cancer and heart disease, may also be inhibited. Thus, as the mapping of the human genome
progresses and new genetic tests proliferate, policy makers
need to evaluate the legislative and regulatory strategies ro
address these concerns.
Toward this goal, this article summarizes and analyzes
state legislation on generic information and health insurance. It also highlights the major policy considerations that
must be addressed in order to reach consensus on future
strategies. This article must be read in context with broader
state health insurance reformsS and privacy legislation, as
well as important federal legislative and regulatory approaches
that affect health insurance and discrimination issues.
The context of insurance6
Group insurance, individual insurance, self-insurance, and
publicly financed insurance (that is, Medicare or Medic-
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aid) represent the primary mechanisms for obtaining health
insurance in the United States. Most insureds receive their
health insurance through their employer, although over
forty million Americans, many of whom are- employed,
remain uninsured. 7
Group insurance may be offered to employers based
on the company's past claims (experience rating) or, as
with Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, on the average cost of a
defined region (community rating). Coverage is also obtained through health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
and managed care plans, which may be subject to federal
HM 0 regulations on rates, preexisting conditions, underwriting, and other provisions of care.
For small groups and individuals who apply for coverage, commercial insurers underwrite based on personal and
family medical history, as well as on risk facrors such as
age, occupation, and use of alcohol-and tobacco. Although
state insurance laws prevent "unfai-r -discrimination," this
provision has nor been interpreted to extend to underwriting based on family and medical history. Furthermore, insurance companies have argued that preventing their access to all medical information will result in adverse selection, by which individuals who know they have a condition, disease, or predisposition to disease may purchase
insurance coverage at a premium that will not cover losses.
With increasing frequency, employers provide health
insurance benefits through self-funded plans, in which the
employer forms its own insurance pool, usually hiring an
insurance company to administer its plan. It is estimated
that over one-third of the nonelderly insured population
throughout this country obtains its coverage through selffunded plans. 1 Self-funded plans providing private health
benefits for employees and their dependents ate exempt
from state insurance laws pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption.' Thus,
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these plans need not follow state laws that require health
insurance contractS to include certain benefits, limit preexisting conditions, follow antidiscrimination restrictions,
or other state health care reforms.
The increasing use of self-funded plans complicates
public policy on genetic information and insurance. Even
though the McCarran-Ferguson Act 10 provides that the
states have the major regulatory authority for the business
of insurance (and so limits any nationwide attempt at insurance reform), ERISA preemption prevents any comprehensive statewide approach to regulating the use of genetic
information by all plans providing health benefits. Currendy, no federal legislation addresses genetic information
in this context. Furthermore, although the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 11 (ADA) protects persons with physical or mental disabilities-including genetic diseases, conditions, and predispositions-from discrimination, 12 Tide
V of the ADA provides that, absent "subterfuge," conventional underwriting of risk by commercial insurers or selfinsured employers does not constitute prohibited discrimination. Thus, any comprehensive strategy to regulate genetic discrimination in health insurance must be evaluated
in the context of numerous state and federal regulatory
issues.

• conditioning the provision of insurance coverage or
benefits on genetic testing; or
• considering generic testing in determining rates.
This approach attempts to integrate protection against
discrimination in insurance practices, coverage, benefits,
and rates with some privacy protection for the individual
and his/her family. Similar approaches have been incorporated to varying degrees in recent legislation passed in California, 17 Colorado, 18 Georgia, 19 Minnesota, 20 New Hampshire/1 Ohio,U and Oregon, 23 as well as in bills currently
pending in Hawaii, 24 Kansas, 25 Massachusetts, u and Pennsylvania. 27 It is worth noting that Ohio law does provide
that an insurer may consider the results of genetic testing if
voluntarily submitted and the results are favorable to the
individual. (See Figures 1 and 2.)

Genetic test defined
These recently enacted statutes, summarized in Figure 1,
focus narrowly on the genetic test, rather than on prohibiting discrimination based more broadly on genetic information generated from family history, physical examination, or the medical record. Oregon lawmakers did attempt
to address this broader definition, but compromised in prohibiting discrimination based on genetic information that
is limited by definition to a genetic test (defined in part as
a test of a genetic characteristic) or an individual's DNA
sample. 28 California does not define genetic test, rather it
prohibits discrimination on the basis of "genetic characteristics," which is defined as "any scientifically or medically
identifiable gene or chromosome, or alteration thereof,
which is known to be a cause of a disease or disorder, or
determined to be associated with a statistically increased
risk of development of a disease or disorder, and which is
asymptomatic of any disease or disorder. "29
Regardless of the definition of genetic test, this new
generanon of legislation is not focused on a specific genetic tra.Jt or condition, but on a potentially unlimited number of tests. Wisconsin defines a genetic test as a rest using
DNA ~extracted from an individual's cells in order to determme the presence of a genetic disease or disorder or the
mdividual's predisposition for a particular genetic disease
or dtsorder. " 10 In the few years since passage of that law,
the deftnition of genetic test has evolved, based in part on
advancmg technologies and medical knowledge, and in part
on political compromise. Minnesota, for example, defines
genetic test as a "presymptomatic test of a person's genes,
gene products, or chromosomes for the purpose of determmmg the presence or absence of a gene or genes that
exhibit abnormalities, defects, or deficiencies, including earner starus, that are known to be the cause of a disease or
disorder, or are determined to be associated with a statistically increased risk of development of a disease or disor-

Evolution of state legislation
In the 1970s, a few states began to pass legislation that
addressed genetics issues. North Carolina, for example,
passed legislation prohibiting health insurers from refusing to issue insurance or from charging higher prerruums
based on sickle cell trait or hemoglobin C trait.ll Florida
passed similar legislation limited to sickle cell trait. 14 Legislation passed by other states addressed primarily employment, forensics, paternity, and other forms of msurance.
Many of these statutes also limited their focus to specific
traits and disorders. By 1986, Maryland did pass legislation prohibiting health insurers from rate dJscnminatlon
based on "sickle-cell trait, thalassemia-minor tra.Jt, hemoglobin C trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or any genetic tra.Jt wh1ch 1s
harmless within itself. " 15 The legislation provided, however, that insurers could continue to use generic inforrTU·
cion to discriminate if there was "acruarial justification. " 1•

Establishing a new framework
By 1991, a new generation of state legislation began to
evolve with the passage of a Wisconsin law prohibmng
health insurers from:
• requiring or requesting an individual or a member of
the individual's family to obtain a genetic test;
• requiring or requesting directly or indirectly into the
results of a genetic test;
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State

Citation

Description

Alabama (1982)

Ala. Scat. 27-5-13

Prohibits health insurers from denying coverage because applicant has siclde
cell anemia._

California {1995)

Insur. Code SS 10123.3,
10140, 10147,
11512.95, 10123.31,
10123.35, 10140.1,
10140S, 11511.96,
11512.965
Health & Safety Code
1374.7, 1374.9

Prohibits health insurance plans from offering or providing different tetms,
conditions, or benefits on the basis of generic characreristics.

Insur. Code SS
10123.3, 10140,
10148, 10149,
10149.1, 11512.95
Health & Safety Code
1374.7

Prohibits health insurance plans from refusing to enroll or accept persons
based on genetic characteristics.

ss

(

California (1994)

s

Prohibits health insurers from imposing a higher rate or charge on the
basis of genetic characteristics.
Provides for privacy proteCtion of genetic information.

Colorado (1994)

1it. 10, art. 3, pt. II,
10-3-1104.7

Prohibits use of information derived from genetic testing to deny access to
health care insurance.
Provides for privacy protection of generic information.

Florida (1978)

Fla. Stat. 626.9707

Prohibits insurers from refusing to issue and deliver any policy of "disabilicy" insurance, which "affords benefits and coverage for any medical treatment or service," solely because a person has the sickle cell trait. .
Prohibits a "disability" insurance policy from charging a higher rate solely
because a person has the sickle cell trait.

Florida (1992)

Fla. Stat. 760.40

Provides for informed consent and privacy protection of genetic informacion.
Provides for mandatory reanalysis if use of genetic information results in a
denial of insurance.

1it. 33, ch. 54

Prohibits use of generic testing except to obtain information for therapeutic
or diagnostic purposes.
Provides for written consent prior to generic testing.
Provides for privacy protection of genetic informatiQn.
Prohibits health insurers from seeking information derived from genetic testing.

---

.....

'\

Georgia (1995)

Maryland (1986)

s

_,

lnsur. Code

s 223(b)(4)

art.

48A,

Prohibits health insurers from making or permitting differentials in rates
based on any generic trait, unless acruarially justified.

Minnesota (1995)

1995 Minn. Laws 251

Prohibits health insurers from using information from generic testing to determine eligibility, establish premiums, limit coverage, or renew coverage.
Prohibits health insurers from requiring a genetic test and from inquiring or
determining whether an individual has had a generic test.

New Hampshire
(1995)

1995 N.H. Laws 101

Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of health insurance
coverage on the results of generic testing.
Prohibits health insurers from considering generic testing to determine rates
or benefits.
Prohibits health insurers from requiring a generic test and from inquiring or
determining whether an individual has had a generic test.

North Carolina
(1975)

N.C. Stat.

S 58-65-70

Prohibits health insurers from denying health insurance because an individual has sickle cell trait or hemoglobin C trait.
Prohibits health insurers from charging higher premiums based on siclde cell
trait or hemoglobin C trait.

Figure 1. Genetic Information and Health Insurance: Enacted Legislation.
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State

Citation

Description

Ohio (1993)

Oh. Stat. SS 1742.42,
1742.43, 3901.49,
3901.491, 3901.50,
3901.501

Prohibits health insurers from cmcding, refusing to issue, renewing cover·
age, or limiting benefits based on genetic screening or testing.
Prohibits health insurers from requiring a genetic test or inquiring about
results of genetic screening or testing.
Provides for consideration of genetic testing if results are favorable to the
applicmt and volunrarily submitted.
Establishes the Task Force on Genetic Testing in Health Insurance.

H. 71 S3, Oh. 120th Gen.
Assembly (1993) (enacted)
Oregon (1995)

1995 Or. Laws 680

Prohibits health insurers from using genetic information to reject, deny, limit,
cancel, refuse to renew, increase the rares of, or affect the terms and condi·
tions of health insurance policies.
Provides for informed consent and privacy protection of genetic informa·
tion.

Virginia (1995)

S.]. Res. 372

Establishes a subcommittee to study the legal and policy ramifications of
breast cmcer susceptibility gene research, including the ethical and legal
issues of health insurance coverage and reimbursement.

Wisconsin (1991)

Wis. Stat.

S 631.89

Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of insurance coverage
or benefits on genetic teSting.
Prohibits use of genetic testing information in determining rates.
Prohibits health insurers from requiring a genetic test or inquiring whether a
genetic rest has been performed.

Figure 1. Continued.

Privacy protections integrated

der. " 31 A few states, including California32 and New Hamp·
shire, 33 include reliance on "scientific or medical" accep·
ranee of the generic rest within its definition.
Most recently, a Wisconsin bill which has been intro·
duced significantly expands the definition of generic test
to include "a physical examination of an individual or an
examination of the family history of an individual to determine ... whether an individual has a genetic disease or disorder
... or is predisposed ro a generic disease or disorder. "J.< To
prohibit discrimination based on prenatal generic testing,
"individual" is defined to include an unborn child.JS

Concerns over privacy and genetic information are ad·
dressed to varying degrees in many of the statutes. As noted
earlier, the Wisconsin law established that insurers may
not "require or request directly or indirectly any individual
to reveal whether the individual or a member of the
individual's family has obtained a generic test or what the
results of the test, if obtained by the individual or a mem·
ber of the individual's family, were." 38 Many of the other
state laws and pending bills (in Figures 1 and 2) have also
adopted this provision. Ironically, the !ecent Wisconsin bill39
that expands the definition of generic-test, deletes this provision. Proponents of the bill believe that as long as state
law prohibits the use of genetic information in the under·
writing process, health insurers may have legitimate rea·
sons to require or request genetic information. For example,
they argue that HMOs, which are both insurers and providers, may need this information to treat the patient and
insurers may need access to this information to verify
claims. 40
Other states have further expanded on privacy issues.
California, for example, prohibits disclosure of genetic test
results to any third party without written authorization. 41
Written authorization is required for each separate disclosure of generic rest results and must specify the person or
entiry to whom the disclosure will be made. Negligent and
willful disclosure without authorization are subject to both
civil and criminal liability. Colorado specifically provides
that information obtained from genetic testing shall be "con·

Insurance entity defined
It is difficult to define in any general terms the "insurance"
entities covered by these statutes, partly because each state
defines its jurisdiction pursuant to its own insurance code
and regulatory authority. Generally, the Statutes cover health
insurance plans, which may be further delineated as hospital service plans, HMOs, third-party administrators, and
government entities providing coverage for health care services on a self-insured basis. New Hampshire boldly extends its definition to include self-insurance plans generally,3' even though ERISA is deemed to preempt state in·
surance regulation for those plans provided by private
employers. This statute also provides, as do most of the
other statutes, that life and disability income insurance are
not included among the insurance entities prohibited from
using generic test results. 37
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State

Citation

Description

Hawaii

s. 299; s. 576;

Prohibits health insurers from requiring genetic testing or inquiring whether
generic resting has been performed.
Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of coverage or benefits on generic testing.
Prohibits health insurers from determining rates based on genetic testing.

H. 1556

Kansas

H. 2251

Prohibits health insurers from requiring or requesting directly or indirectly
any individual ro obtain a generic test or ro reveal whether one has been
performed.
Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of coverage or benefits on generic resting.
Prohibits health insurers from determining rates based on generic testing.

Massachusetts

s. 2045

Establishes commission to consider appropriate role for state regarding the
use of generic information, including whether state should take a direct
role in regulating collection, access to, and use of generic information.
Prohibits health insurers from refusing to enroll any person on the basis of
generic testing.
Prohibits health insurers from imposing a higher rate on the basis of generic characteristics.
Provides for informed consent and privacy protection of generic information.
Prohibits underwriterS from seeking or obtaining generic information.

'i

H. 4485

Michigan

H. 5237

Prohibits insurance companies from refusing to insure or limiting coverage
due to refusal to submit to .generic testing or the results of generic resting.

Nebraska

L. 698

Establishes commission to srudy the use of human genetic information and
its impact on insurance.

Pennsylvania

H. 1662

Prohibits health insurers from requiring or requesting direcrly or indirectly
any individual to obtain a generic test or to reveal whether one has been
obtained and, if so, its results.
Prohibits health insurers from conditioning provision of coverage on generic testing.
Prohibits health insurers from determining rates based on generic testing.

A. 227

Broadens the current state definition of generic test to include physical examinarion or family hisrory.
Removes current prohibitions against requiring or requesting an individual
to obtain a generic test or to reveal whether one has been obtained and, if
so, Its results.
Maintains the prohibitions against conditioning insurance coverage or
determining rares based on generic resting.

---

Wisconsin

Figure 2. Genetic Information and Health Insurance:: Pending Legislation as of December 31, 1995.

fidenrial and privileged," 42 and Oregon and Georgia establish that generic information is the "property of the individual. " 43 Nevertheless, they both provide, as do a number
of the other states, for specific exceptions in which written
authorization is not required for disclosure (that is, paternity, criminal proceedings, or health department protocols).
Even when these statutes require informed consent prior
to genetic testing, they do not address whether the informed
consent process will incorporate a warning that the test
results may be disclosed without authorization under certain circumstances.

A Florida law passed in 1992 also permits DNA analysis to be used 'Nithour informed consent in criminal prosecu·
tions, other criminal matters, and paternity determinations.""
Except in these circumstances, the Statute declares that the
test results are the exclusive property of the person tested,
are confidential, and may not be disclosed without consent.
Nevertheless, the statute does not prohibit the use of genetic information in determining health insurance coverage and benefits. If DNA test results are used in any decision to
grant or deny insurance, the individual must be notified,
and the analysis must be repeated to verify its accuracy.
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Some statUtes address privacy issues created by access
to shared insurance data bases. The Wisconsin45 and New
Hampshire44 laws provide that insurers writing life and
disability income insurance in addition to health insurance cannot use genetic test information to underwrite their
health insurance policies. In Minnesota, where a life insurance company may require a genetic test, the statute provides that written informed consent must include information on the uses and limitations of the test, as well as
the individual's right to confidential treaonent of the information. 47 It is worth noting that the Minnesota statute specifically provides that "[if] the individual tested has
not given written consent authorizing the physician to
receive the test results, the individual must be urged
at the time that the individual is informed of the genetic
test results ... to contact a generic counselor or other
health care professional. " 48 Similar provisions are included in the California statute49 and the MassachusettS
bill_5°

Study groups established
Over the last few years, a number of states, most recently
Nebraska,S 1 Ohio,n and Vtrginia, 53 have passed legislation
. , .. to. establish task forces or commissions to study the policy
and societal issues raised by genetic information. The state
of Virginia specifically provides for a subcommittee to
study the l~al and policy ramifications of breast cancer
susceptibility· gene research, including the ethical and
legal issues of health insurance coverage and reimbursement.

Other legislative experiences
Recently, a number of other states have attempted to pass
without success legislation addressing generic discrimination and health. Proposals often failed because of splits
along political party lines. In Texas/' the genetic discrimination and insurance bill failed in committee despite a compromise that would have removed disability income and
life insurance. When the bill was put to a committee vote,
two liberal members refused to support the bill because it
was limited only to health insurance. In fact, in a number
of the states that have enacted legislation, bills were passed
only after life and/or disability income insurance were excluded. New York State has attempted legislation to address health insurance issues as part of a comprehensive
omnibus bill addressing numerous generic discrimination
issues. ss This approach has not achieved support, and the
legislature is now considering ocher bills limited to one
issue at a rime (that is, employmenrl6 or privacf?). In other
states, legislators have indicated that there is a lack of understanding and legislative apathy concerning the issue of
genetic discrimination.

Policy considerations
The development of public policy to address generic information and health insurance must be analyzed in light of a
complex and inadequate health insurance system, the uncertainty about the future scope and impact of generic testing, and the political realities of a pluralistic society. The
current patchwork of state legislative approaches does not
provide a comprehensive solution to genetic discrimination and health insurance. State laws focus narrowly on
genetic tests, rather than broadly on genetic information
generated by family history, physical examination, or the
medical record. Although health insurers are prohibited
from using the results of a chemical test of DNA, or the
protein product of a gene, they can still use other phenotype indicators, patterns of inheritance of genetic characteristics, or requests for genetic testing as the basis for discrimination.58 Thus, "meaningful protection against generic
discrimination requires that insurers be prohibited from
using all information about genes, gene products, or inherited characteristics to deny or limit health insurance coverage. "59
Second, a large proportion of the population receives
its health benefits from self-insured plans not subject to
State insurance laws. The ERISA preemption prevents a
statewide approach to regulating the use of genetic information by all plans providing health benefits. Furthermore,
no federal laws specifically address genetic discrimination
in health insurance.
Recent health insurance proposals at both the state
and federal level focus primarily on modest reform in the
areas of accessibility, portability, and renewability of coverage, prohibiting insurers from denying coverage based
on health Status or medical condition, but often permitting
exclusions for preexisting conditions for limited time periods. It is unclear whether and to what extent genetic information would be covered by these proposals. 60 For example,
unlike medical conditions, generic information may provide insight into an individual's and/or family member's
predisposition to future disease. 61
With these policy considerations in mind, the followmg recommendations were developed by the Working
Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the
Human Genome Project (ELSI) 62 and the National Action
Plan on Breast Cancer (NA.PBC)'J as guidelines for both
state and federal policy makers to protect against genetic
discrimination: 64
(1) Insurance providers should be prohibited from
using genetic information, or an individual's request
for genetic services, to deny or limit any coverage or
to eStablish eligibility, continuation, enrollment, or
contribution requirements.
(2) Insurance providers should be prohibited from
establishing differential rates or premium payments
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against an individual or f2mily based soldy on an ap~t or
perceived generic variation from the 'normal' human genotype."
P.R. Billings et al, •Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic
Tc:sring," AmerU:tm journal of Human Genetics, 50 (1992): at
476.
3. This is nor to imply that fear of generic disaim.ination is
not an issue in the life and disability income insurance context
as welL However, this article, Iilce most legislative approaches
to date, focuses on health insurance. But see Ariz. Rev. Sat.
Ann. S 20-448 (1989); and Mont. Code Ann. S 33-18-206 (1991)
(life and disability insurance).
4. See Billings et aL, supra note 2. See also K. Hudson et
al., .. Generic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent
Need for Reform." Scinta, 270 (1995): 391-93.
5. Sate insurance reforms have addressed community rating, preexisting condition clauses, portability, guaranteed issue,
and renewaL For a description of recent stare legislative activity
on health care reform, see generally K. l.adenheim. L Lipson,
and A. Markus, Health Care Reform: 50 State Profiles (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, 1994); and D. Parde and C. Popolo,
Health Care Reform in the States: A Special Report on State
Health Care Reform Initiatives (Alexandria: Council for Affordable Health Insurance, 1994).
6. This summary is based on two excdlenr discussions describing health insurance. See Advances in Genetic Information:
A Guide for State Policy Makers (Lexington: Council of Sate
Governments, 1993); and Genetic Information and Health Insurance {Bethesda: Task Force on Generic Information and Insurance, NIH-DOE Working Group on Ethical, Legal,. and Social lmpl.icarions of Human Genome Research, 1993).
7. See Hudson ct aL, supra noa: 4 (citing Employee Benefit
Research Insrirute, Special Report SR-26, Issue Brief 158 (1995)).
8. See Hudson et al., supra note 4, at 392.
9. 29 u.s.c. (1974).
10. 15 u.s.c. 1011 (1988).
1 L 42 U.S.C. S 12101-12213 {1990);and42 U.S.C.S 12201
(1990).
12. On March 15, 1995, the Equal Employment Opporruniry Commission clarified that "disability" applies to individuals who are subjecred to discrimination on the basis of generic
mformation relating to illness, disease, or other disorders. To
illustrate their policy further, one example of generic discriminanon based on generic information concerns an individual with
an increased susceptibility to colon cancer. Equal Employment
Opporrumry Commission, Compliance Manual Section 902:
D~(imt:on of rhe Term "Disability" (Mar. 15, 1995).
13. N.C. Gen. Stat. S 58-65-70 (1975).
14. Fla. Stat. A.nn. S 626.9707 (West 1978).
15. Md. Code A.nn., Insur., S 223 (1986).
16. Id.
17. CaL lnsur. Code SS 10123.2, 10123.3, 10123.31,
10123.35. 10140, 10140.1, 10140.5, 10147, 10148, 10149,
10149.1, 11512.95, 11512.96, 11512.965 (West 1994 & West
1995); and G.L Health & Safery Code SS 1374.7, 1374.9 (West
1994 & West 1995).
18. CoL Rev. Scar. S 10-3-1104.7 (1994).
19. Ga. Code .A.nn. S33-54-1-8 (1995).
20. 1995 .'viinn. Laws 251.
21. 1995 N.H. Laws 101.
22. Ohio Rev. Code A.nn. SS 1742.42, 1742.43, 3901.49,
3901.491, 3901.50, 3901.501 (Baldwin 1993).
23. 1995 Or. Laws 680.
24. S. 576 and S. 299, Haw. 18th Leg. (1995); and H. 1556,
Haw. 18th Leg. (1995).

based on genetic information, or an individual's re-

quest for genetic services.

I:

(3) Insurance providers should be prohibited from
requesting or requiring collection or disclosure of genetic information.
(4) Insurance providers and other holders of genetic
information should be prohibited from releasing genetic information without prior written authorization of the individual. Written authorization should
be required for each disclosure and include to whom
the disclosure would be made.

The recommendations further provide that genetic information be defined as "information about genes, gene
products, or inherited characteristics that may derive from
the individual or a family member. " 65 Insurance provider
is defined as "an insurance company, employer, or any other
entity providing a plan of health insurance or health benefits including group and individual health plans whether
fully insured or self-funded.""
These recommendations evolved, in part, from a critical analysis of State legislative approaches. nus analytical
framework is intended to stimulate a comprehensive solution to geneti~-~scrimination in health insurance117 that
integrates bach privacy protection and the reality that genetic information is much more than jusr a test result.
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